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ABSTRACT 
Several previous studies have concluded that individuals ' 
personal economic conditions exert only weak, intermittent effects 
upon their voting decisions. These studies,  however, have all used the 
same measure to test the same basic hypothesis -- that economic 
adversity of any kind leads to voting against the incumbent President 
and candidates of his party. This study uses answers to a battery of 
open-ended questions included in the 1972-1976 CPS National Election
S tudies to develop new and more detailed indicators of personally 
experienced economic problems . These data are then used to test an 
alternative, policy-oriented hypothesis that personal difficulties 
resulting from inflation lead voters to give greater support to the 
Republicans , while voters personally injured by unemployment give 
greater support to the Democrats. 
In analyzing these new measures this study repeatedly found 
important differences between inflation and unemployment . First , 
unemployment inflicts substantial obj ective economic costs while the 
maj or costs of inflation , at least in the short run, are the more 
intangible psychological costs of coping with more uncertainty. 
Secondly, the costs of unemployment are heavily concentrated among 
certain sectors of the labor force , while the costs of inflation are 
borne roughly equally by all maj or groups in society. Thirdly, inflation 
and unemployment differ markedly in their political ramifications . Only 
a small percentage of individuals cited unemployment , but they tended 
to perceive the Democrats to be better at dealing with unemployment ,  
and gave relatively greater support to Democratic candidates . In 
contrast, during the period studied a large percentage of the 
citizenry cited inflation as their most serious economic problem. 
But these voters did not give a s.ignificant edge to either party as 
better able to handle inflation ,  nor did their concern over inflation 
systematically affect their choices. in presidential and congressional 
elections. 
THE EFFECTS OF PERSONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 
UPON VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS 
D. Roderick Kiewiet 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the last few years there have appeared several studies 
investigating the impact of personal economic experiences upon voting. 
The notion that voters' choices are strongly influenced by such 
experiences obviously has great appeal. It would seem self-evident 
that directly experienced economic adversity has a much stronger 
impact on attitudes and behaviors than to indirectly hear or read 
about it. This view jibes nicely with our intuitions about human 
nature, i.e. that people tend to look out for Number One. 
Furthermore, given the mass public's typically low level of 
attentiveness to public affairs [Converse, 1975) , a strong 
" information cost" argument can be made in its favor. As Popkin et 
al. [1976) argue, people can pick up all the political information 
they need in shopping, investing, and other routine economic 
activities. 
Most of these studies based their analyses upon individuals' 
perceived financial situation, as measured by a question included in 
every CPS National Election Study since 1956. This question simply 
asks respondents whether the financial situation of themselves and 
their families had improved, stayed the same, or worsened during the 
past year. The obvious prediction is that the more unfavorable the 
individual's recent economic fortunes the more he or she will vote 
against the incumbent President and his partys' congressional 
candidates. 
Although these studies utilized a wide range of research 
strategies and statistical models, they all reached similar 
conclusions. Individuals' perceptions of their own financial 
condition exerted only weak, scattered effects upon voting in 
congressional, senatorial, and gubernatorial elections, and more 
consistent but still quite modest effects in presidential races [Ben-
Gera Logan, 1977 ; Fiorina, 1978 ; Klorman, 1978 ; Kinder and Kiewiet, 
1979). There is, in short, substantial agreement with Kinder and 
Kiewiet' s [ 1979) verdict, that "Under ordinary circumstances, voters 
evidently do not make connections between their own personal economic 
experiences -- however vivid, immediate, and otherwise significant 
and their political attitudes and preferencesN (p. 522). 
Given the great intuitive appeal of the underlying hypothesis, 
the failure to find anything more than small, intermittent effects 
associated with these financial perceptions is striking. There are, 
however, serious limitations to the work which has been done in this 
area. First, as noted above, most analyses have examined the same 
measure of perceived financial conditions. Even more importantly, 
attention has been confined to the single hypothesis of incumbency-
oriented voting, i.e. that economic decline leads to a rejection of 
the incumbents. But as Stigler [1973) and others have suggested, 
voting in response to economic difficulties may be policy-oriented, 
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especially with regard to inflation and unemployment. Given the 
different policy priorities of the two major parties [Sundquist, 1968; 
Okun, 1973; Hibbs, 1977 ; Tufte, 1978), a policy-oriented hypothesis 
predicts that, everything else being equal, voters concerned about 
unemployment will tend to support Democratic candidates, while voters 
more concerned about inflation will opt for the Republicans.I 
To characterize such voting as "policy-oriented" is not to 
imply that voters need a sophisticated understanding of fiscal or 
monetary policy instruments. On the contrary, their concern over 
inflation or unemployment can be confined solely to policy outcomes. 
Neither must they believe anything in particular about the empirical 
relationship between inflation and unemployment, or recognize that 
full employment and price stability pose conflicting goals. In short, 
policy-oriented voting in this context requires only that voters (1) 
see inflation or unemployment as a personally troublesome problem, ( 2) 
believe that public policies should be directed toward alleviating 
their problem, and (3) perceive differences between the parties in the 
amount of effort and/or skill they would apply in com.batting their 
problem. 
Previous research provides evidence supportive of each of 
these points. First, economic concerns are central to American life. 
When asked to name their fondest hopes and worst fears, Americans 
refer most frequently to their economic well-being in times of both 
uncertainty [Campbell et al., 1976) and prosperity [Cantril, 1965). 
Secondly, individuals' policy preferences often reflect their own 
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economic standing [Campbell et al., 1960). More specifically, Hibbs' 
( 1977) analysis of survey data led him to conclude that "Low and 
middle income and occupational status groups are more averse to 
unemployment than inflation, whereas, upper income and occupational 
status groups are more concerned about inflation than unemployment" 
(p. 1470). Even more to the point, Kiewiet and Kinder (1978) and 
Sears et al. ( 1980) report that individuals who had recently suffered 
unemployment were more supportive than average of government job and 
standard of living guarantees. Thirdly, it appears to be in the area 
of economic policy where perceptions of differences between the 
Democrats and Republicans are most prevalent. Going back to � 
A1Derican Voter again, Campbell et al. ( 1960) report that "Questions 
having to do with governmental underwriting of medical costs, aid to 
education, guaranteed employment, contol of big business and labor 
unions, and federal housing and electric power production all reveal 
tendencies to link the Democratic party with the New Deal position" 
(p. 184). Repass ( 1971) found even stronger perceptions of party 
differences on economic policy issues when he limited analysis to 
those issues most salient to the individual respondent. There is, 
then, plenty of reason to suspect that individuals tend to react to 
directly experienced difficulties resulting from unemployment by 
giving greater support to Democratic candidates, and to problems due 
to inflation by supporting Republicans. 
II. A NEW LOOK AT OLD EVIDENCE
As indicated above, research in this field has concentrated 
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almost entirely upon the same measure of consumer finances. A couple 
of studies, however -- by Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) and Fiorina ( 1980) 
did look specifically at personal difficulties due to unemployment. 
Kinder and Kiewiet's analysis utilized a dummy variable which 
registered whether or not the respondent's head of household had been 
out of work at some time in the last year or two. They found that 
this measure did no better than the personal finances item in 
predicting votes for or against the incumbent party's candidates. 
When their result& are examined from the perspective of policy­
oriented voting, however, a clear pattern emerges. After making a few 
desirable changes in their estimation procedures, these results are 
shown in Table 1.2 The top numbers in each entry are the probit 
estimates, the numbers in parentheses beneath them are standard 
errors. As in their original analysis, the personal finances item was 
also specified (the ''better off," "same, " and "worse off" categories 
taking on the values of l, 3, and·5 respectively), as were party 
identification terms.3 Estimates of the latter, of course, were 
always quite large and statistically significant. This has no direct 
bearing on the analysis here, however, and so for the sake of 
conciseness these estimates are not reported. Reported votes for 
Democratic candidates are represented by 0, reported Republican votes 
by 1, so positive signs are in a pro-Republican direction. 
[Table 1 about here] 
As previous studies had shown, estimates for the personal 
finances term were generally in keeping with incumbency-oriented 
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voting. Also as before, this effect was quite weak and erratic in 
congressional elections, but somewhat stronger in presidential races. 
Signs of the estimates were in the correct (incumbency-oriented) 
direction in all six presidential elections, and four of the six were 
statistically significant. Only eight of the twelve estimates for 
congressional races were consistent with incumbency-oriented voting, 
and only three were statistically significant (th� significant 1966 
estimate was in the wrong direction). 
This, of course, is old and familiar. What is striking about 
Table 1, though, is that the sign of the head of household's 
unemployment term is in a negative and thus pro-Democratic direction 
in eighteen of the nineteen elections studied. The results of 
Fiorina's (1980) analysis were virtually identical. The only 
exception is the 1968 presidential race, an election in which George 
Wallace made substantial inroads into the Democratic party's 
traditional blue collar constituency. Whether or not a Democrat sat 
in the White House, then, respondents from households whose 
breadwinner had been out of work consistently gave more support to 
candidates of the Democratic party. 
As with the personal finances measure, the impact of 
unemployment appears to be somewhat stronger in presidential elections 
than in congressional ; weighting each estimate by the inverse of its 
standard error, the mean estimates were -.383 and -.235 respectively. 
This makes sense, given the lower salience of congressional races 
[Stokes and Miller, 1962), and that the President is probably held 
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more directly accountable for economic conditions than his party's 
House candidates. But the size of the estimates varied widely ; in six 
elections the estimates exceed .S, but in four others they are less 
than .1. Another indication of how weak the estimates often are is 
the fact that only five of the nineteen attain conventional levels of 
statistical significance. True, in 1956 and 1966 the unemployment 
measure reflects current status only, and the low N (in 1956 only 15 
respondents reported that their head of household was currently 
unemployed) makes statistical significance difficult to achieve. But 
low N is usually not the problem; an average of ltO voters in the 
surveys report their head of household has been out of work in the 
previous six months, and when the previous year is considered, the 
average is 108. So while voters from families which have been 
affected by unemployment appear to consistently give greater support 
to Democratic candidates, the magnitude of this support is only 
occasionally impressive. 
When we consider that the large majority of voters are not 
personally troubled by unemployment, it is evident that the impact of 
such difficulties upon electoral outcomes would be quite small. 
Still, the support these data have generated for the policy-oriented 
hypothesis is greater than the support other data on personal economic 
fortunes have given the incumbency-oriented hypothesis. 
There are obviously shortcomings in this analysis. Above all, 
it concerns only the unemployment side of the hypothesis ; the 
corollary is that voters for whom inflation is a serious personal 
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problem give greater support to the Republicans. What is needed in 
order to conduct a more compelling test of the policy-oriented 
hypothesis are new measures, richer in information about the specific 
economic problems which people confront. The task of developing and 
analyzing these new indicators is undertaken in the next section. 
III. SELF-REPORTED PERSONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 
In the analysis to follow, individuals who do perceive 
unemployment, inflation, or other economic problems to be personally 
troublesome are identified by their responses to a battery of open-
ended questions included in all three legs of the 1972-76 CPS American 
Panel Study. 4aespondents were asked: 
Let's change the subject for a moment. We like to have 
people tell us what sorts of problems they have to deal 
with in their daily lives. Can you tell me what some of 
the problems are that you face these days in your life? 
• Anything else? 
Although these questions did not specifically refer to economic 
problems, well over half the problems mentioned were economic in 
nature. References to unemployment and inflation were naturally 
sorted out, but categories of other important economic problems were 
derived from the verbatim interview data as well.5 The coding scheme 
which was thus developed, along with the marginal frequencies from all 
three years, is presented in Table 2. What are reported are the 
respondents' most important personal economic problems. If a 
repondent mentioned some noneconomic problem as the most important one 
he or she faced, e.g. poor health, but also mentioned an economic 
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problem, the economic problem was the one which was coded here. 
[Table 2 about here) 
As Table 2 shows, respondents cited inflation more frequently 
than any other economic problem. This category includes all 
references to high or rising prices, either for specific commodities 
like food or fuel oil, or to prices in general. Although inflation 
technically pertains only to price increases, it appeared that few 
people differentiated between high prices and rising prices. 
Respondents used the terms interchangeably ; complaints such as "high 
food prices inflation in general" and "the high cost of living 
rising heating costs" were quite common. And the distinction may be 
little more than a difference in temporal perspective, i.e. prices are 
high now because of past inflation but rising because of continuing 
inflation. Confidence that this category registers what it is 
supposed to is bolstered by the fact that the percentage of 
respondents naming inflation their worst personal economic problem 
corresponded closely to the objective rate of inflation which obtained 
in these years (the Consumer Price Index rose by 3.3 percent, 11.0 
percent, and 5. 8 percent in 1972, 197 4, and 1976, respectively). 
Many economists have suspected that there is substantial 
confusion among the public concerning inflation and its costs. After 
all, it is real incomes and real prices which should concern people, 
not the nominal price level. Thus in explaining widespread aversion 
to inflation it has been suggested that people confuse inflation with 
a declining real income. Such confusion is understandable � the 
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typical way real incomes are reduced is for price inflation to outpace 
one's wage increases. People may thus blame the mechanism (price 
inflation) instead of the end result (a lower real income). 
But as Table 2 indicates, between five and seven percent of 
the respondents did refer explicitly to a declining real income. A 
variety of responses were subsumed under this category: failure of 
wages to keep up with price increases ; living on a fixed income and 
being squeezed by inflation ; complaints about declining purchasing 
power ("I've got more dollars but they don't go as far"). This 
category also includes complaints about failing to maintain the 
standard of living one ia accustomed to, or having great difficulty in 
doing so, e.g. being forced to work extra hours or taking a second job 
in order to pay the bills. 
The unemployment related category is broadly defined. It 
contains all respondents who felt their worst economic problem was 
that they (or persona close to them) were laid off, unemployed, 
worried by the threat of unemployment, or underemployed, i.e. unable 
to work enough hours. Despite the breadth of this definition, 
surprisingly few respondents fell into this category -- between 3.4 
and 4. 4  percent. It might be argued that many respondents felt 
references to unemployment would reflect badly on themseives, and thus 
chose to name some other problem. This seems very unlikely, however, 
given that they showed no reluctance to admit that they (or family 
members) were out of work in response to other questions. Whatever 
the reason, the percentage of respondents naming unemployment their 
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worst problem was lower than the objective rate of unemployment. 
Similarly, not too many respondents referred to �as their 
worst personal economic problem. Surprisingly, the percentage was 
higher in the relatively prosperous year of 1972 (5.5 percent) and 
lower in the recession year of 1974 (only 1.3 percent). Perhaps there 
is a sort of rough hierarchy in the perception of economic problems, 
with taxes becoming salient only when other problems, e. g. 
unemployment, rising prices, appear to pose no immediate danger. 
While there are any number of taxes one might find distasteful, in 
most cases it could not be ascertained what form of taxation the 
respondent was alluding to. A residual category, general or 
miscellaneous economic problems, was largely composed of vague 
references to such things as "bills," "money problems," or "not making 
enough money. " As Table 2 shows, the percentage of respondents 
falling into this category was remarkably stable from year to year 
around 20 percent each time. In fact, the size of most categories 
remained quite stable from year to year ; only the percentage citing 
inflation fluctuated much. And as indicated earlier, the size of the 
inflation category clearly reflected the actual rates of inflation in 
197 2, 197 4, and 1976. 
Cross-tabular analyses of the economic problem reports 
revealed key differences between unemployment and inflation. First, 
respondents who cited unemployment were nearly twice as likely as 
average to report their financial situation had worsened during the 
past year. This is probably about what we should expect, given the 
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serious objective economic costs of being out of work. It is true 
that about BO percent of the labor force is covered by some form of 
unemployment insurance, but such compensation falls far short of 
making up for lost income. As Cameron (1979] points out, the 
unemployed come disproportionately from that segment of the labor 
force which is not covered by compensation programs, and benefits for 
those who are covered amount, on average, to less than half the gross 
earnings of the typical production worker. 
Respondents in the inflation category, on the other hand, 
appeared to differ little in their assessments of their own economic 
conditions. 33 percent of them reported being financially worse off 
than a year ago, a figure barely distinguishable from the total sample 
rate of 30 percent. These data suggest that a large share of the 
discomfort associated with inflation is .BQ!. attributable to objective 
economic losses. Hibbs (1978] is almost certainly right, therefore, 
in concluding that "less tangible subjective and psychological factors 
are more important than objective costs in explaining widespread 
public aversion to inflation" (p. 12). No doubt one such factor, as 
hinted earlier, is the failure of many people to make the connection 
between rising prices and rising wages. As shown in Katona'& ( 1975] 
analysis, they tend to consider increases in their income.the well­
deserved result of their own efforts -- doing a good job, acquiring 
more skill and experience, getting a promotion or better job, etc. 
Only a small minority of respondents in his surveys reported that 
their income had risen on account of better business conditions, union 
efforts, or from inflation-induced COLA increases. So although people 
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do not apparently confuse inflation with a lower real income, they 
probably do see it as something which prevents their purchasing power 
from going up as much as it should have. 
There is another "psychological" factor associated with 
inflation, but it is a true cost, in no way resulting from a 
perceptual bias. Inflation increases the information costs entailed 
in everyday economic decision-making. Because of it, the past price 
of a certain good becomes a less valid indicator of what a reasonable 
price for the same good should be at present. People thus feel 
greater uncertainty about whether or not they are spending their money 
wisely, or whether their wages are suitable reward for the work they 
do. And as Katona [1975) and Okun [1975] have both noted, stable 
prices are imbued with notions of fairness; when prices instead are 
rising, people become more anxious as to whether they are paying a 
"fair" price for a good or service or are being ripped off. 
Similarly, many people's values are upset by the incentive inflation 
creates to consume immediately (or to borrow to consume, for that 
matter) instead of saving and deferring consumption.6 
Besides differing in the nature of the costs they inflict, 
unemployment and inflation also differ in the way their costs are 
distributed. The percentages of respondents citing unemployment and 
related difficulties closely parallelled the objective rates of 
joblessness prevailing among different racial and occupational groups. 
According to the 1976 cross-sectional data, blacks were more than 
twice as likely as whites to refer to unemployment -- 7.9 percent to 
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3.7 percent. Among occupational categories the percentages ranged 
from only 1.6 percent of managerial-administrative personnal to 14.0 
percent of nonfarm laborers. In contrast, there was little 
correlation between respondents' propensity to cite inflation and a 
host of background socioeconomic characteristics, such as income, age, 
sex, race, and union membership.7 The evidence here, then, is quite 
corroborative of Katona's [1915] study. He found that individuals' 
responses to a question asking hov badly they were being hurt by 
inflation -- much, a little, or not at all-- had virtually nothing to 
do with their income level. 
These findings would thus indicate that (to the extent 
subjective perceptions mirror objective conditions) inflation does not 
systematically help or harm members of different age, income, or 
occupational groups. At first this would seem to contradict a vast 
body of economic literature reviewed by Hibbs [1977] , which in his 
words, shows that "lover income and occupational groups are best 
served by a relatively low unemployment-high inflation macroeconomic 
configuration" (p. 1467). Complaints about inflation, therefore, 
should have been less frequent among such respondents, but as 
indicated above there was no real evidence of this pattern. A closer 
reading of Hibbs' discussion makes clear, however, that lower income­
occupational groups do no benefit from inflation per se. Rather, it 
is that when labor markets are tight, such workers suffer lower rates 
of unemployment and earn relatively higher wages. Although this 
situation tends to be inflationary, it is the demand for their labor, 
not inflation, which benefits these workers. Indeed, several studies 
14 
have shown inflation to have little if any effect on the distribution 
of income or wealth [Hollister and Palmer, 1972; Bach and Stephenson, 
1974; Blinder and Esaki, 1977; Piachaud, 1978]. 8 But what about 
Bibbs' ( 1978] survey data alluded to earlier? He reported that when 
asked "which of the two problems -- inflation or unemployment -- do 
you think will cause the more serious economic hardship for people 
during the next year or so?" respondents from lower status, blue 
collar occupations were more likely to name unemployment (and less 
likely to name inflation) than their higher status, white collar 
counterparts. Again, the contradiction is more apparent than real. 
For this is exactly the pattern which would emerge if these groups 
were, as indicated in this study, equally averse to inflation but 
differentially averse to unemployment. 
In su:mmary, marked differences exist between personal 
difficulties resulting from inflation and those associated with 
unemployment. There are substantial objective economic costs 
associated with unemployment, and these costs are concentrated 
disproportionately among lower income and occupational groups. The 
immediate short-term costs of inflation, however, are not objective 
income and wealth effects, but the more intangible costs of operating 
in a more uncertain and anxiety-provoking economic enviromnent.9 
These costs, furthermore, are borne in roughly equal proportion by 
people from all walks of life. 
IV. THE EFFECT OF PERSONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS ON VOTING 
IN PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
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The following analysis will seek to estimate the influence of 
directly experienced economic problems upon voters' choices in 
national elections. The hypothesis, of course, is that voters who 
believe inflation is their worst personal economic problem will give 
relatively greater support to the Republicans, while those who cite 
unemployment related problems will be more likely to vote Democratic. 
The probit model to be estimated is a simple one, taking the 
form: 
VP,C f (So + SlR + SzD + SjPE + u)
where vP,C a reported presidential or congressional vote, taking 
on the value of 0 if Democratic, 1 if Republican. 
So 
R 
• a constant term. 
• a dummy variable which, in 1972 takes on the value of
1 if the respondent identifies with the Republican 
party (as either a strong or weak identifier, or as 
an Independent leaning Republican), 0 otherwise. 
In 197 4 and 1976 this variable reflects the respondent's 
vote in the previous elections. It then takes on the 
value of 1 if the vote was Republican, 0 otherwise.10 
D = the same as above, except it registers Democratic 
identifiers or respondents who voted Democratic in 
the previous election. A reference group is thus 
composed of respondents who are Independents (in 1972) 
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PE. 
J 
u 
or who had not voted in the previous election (in 1974 
and 1976). 
a battery of dummy variables, one for each of the 
categories of personal economic problems which were 
coded. The reference groups are composed of those 
respondents who either reported no economic problems 
or no problems whatsoever. 
• a randomly distributed error term. 
Results are reported in Table 3. As before, the top numbers are the 
probit estimates, the numbers in parentheses below them are the 
standard errors. Positive signs are pro-Republican in direction, 
negative signs are pro-Democratic. 
[Table 3 about here] 
The most impressive figures in these equations are for the 
"unemployment related" variable. In all five elections the signs are 
pro-Democratic in direction, and in the 1976 presidential and 
congressional elections the estimates are statistically significant. 
The estimates for the 1972 elections are also pretty high, but so are 
the standard errors -- due mainly to the fact that only half the 
respondents in that election study were asked the personal problems 
questions. The verdict here, then, is the same as that reached in the 
analysis of the head of household's unemployment variable -- voters 
who directly experience unemployment consistently give greater support 
to Democratic presidential and congressional candidates, but the 
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magnitude of this support is only occasionally impressive. 
The inflation side of the hypothesis, on the other hand, 
receives very little support. In the 1972 presidential election the 
effect of this variable is in the correct (pro-Republican) direction 
and statistically significant. But this is the only bright spot; all 
other estimates are both very feeble and in the wrong direction. This 
suggests that policy-oriented voting may be for or against specific 
candidates, and not just parties in general. In 1972, apparently, 
voters who viewed inflation to be a serious personal problem did not 
hold this against Democratic congressional candidates, but they were 
wary of McGovern. This differential pattern of support is reasonable. 
To many voters his $1,000 for everybody "demogrant" proposal probably 
sounded like printing up a large new batch of money, and Democratic 
congressional candidates were about as likely to endorse this scheme 
as they were to favor acid, amnesty, and abortion. This is 
speculation, of course. What is responsible for this finding may in 
fact be Type l error. Still it seems entirely likely that policy-
oriented voting is often candidate-specific, especially when 
presidential candidates espouse views more extreme than those of the 
mainstream of their party. 
The decision to distinguish between references to :inflation 
per se and declining real income appears to have been worthwhile. 
Estimates of this variable's effect are all pro-Democratic direction, 
and four of the five are more pro-Democratic than the respective 
estimates for inflation. The gain was an exceedingly modest one, 
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however, as differences between the two are generally small. In fact, 
the return on investment in this entire enterprise is not overly 
impressive. True, there are differences in the political response to 
the above three sets of problems; averaging across all five 
presidential and congressional elections, the mean estimates were 
-.011 for inflation, -.l.50 for declining real income, and -.404 for 
unemployment. Moreover, that the unemployment effect is much more 
pro-Democratic than the others accords well with the policy- oriented 
voting hypothesis, as does the anti-McGovern direction of the 
inflation term in 1972. But for the remaining sets of problems there 
is little to be said. Estimates for the effect of taxes as a 
perceived personal problem are erratic in direction, while those for 
the "general economic problems" category do not reliably differ from 
zero. 
The probit model estimated here is admittedly a very simple 
one. Cross-tabular and further probit analyses, however, revealed 
that the estimates generated by it are nonetheless quite robust. 
First of all, estimates of the problem measures were not suppressed 
due to high correlation with the partisanship terms. Respondents in 
the unemployment category were more Democratic than average, but this 
was precisely the same category where reliable effects upon voting had 
been found. The partisan composition of respondents in the inflation 
or general economic problems categories, on the other hand, differed 
little from that of the total sample. Secondly, the problem 
categories were virtually independent of views on other noneconomic 
issue items. And like the previous analysis of the respondent's head 
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of household's employment status, the same pattern of results were 
produced by several alternative specifications. In short, effects due 
to personal economic problems were in all probability not suppressed 
by specified measures with which they were strongly correlated, or by 
failure to specify measures with which they were negatively 
associated. 
To a large extent these findings recapitulate those of the 
previous analysis. Voters who personally experience unemployment or 
difficulties associated with unemployment give somewhat more support 
to Democratic candidates. This effect, however, is confined to a 
small subset of the electorate. Conversely, problems cited by 
substantially larger numbers of voters, such as inflation or general 
economic problems, have little discernible impact µpon voting 
decisions. 
V. FACTORS LIMITING THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF PERSONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 
The only reliable support afforded the hypothesis that voting 
in response to personal economic problems is policy-oriented concerned 
unemployment. 'What prevents personal unemployment problems from 
taking on major electoral significance, however, is that such problems 
appear to be salient to only small numbers of people. Th�s is not to 
say that few people are affected by unemployment -- in all three legs 
of the 1972-76 Panel Study over 20 percent of the respondents who were 
in the labor force reported being out of work at least once during the 
previous year. 'Why, then, are unemployment and related difficulties 
apparently cited by only a small subset of those who have actually 
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been affected by it? 
['Iable 4 about here] 
Some strong clues are provided in 'Iable 4. which displays the 
extent to which actual experiences with unemployment are reflected in 
self-reported economic problems. Not surprisingly, those respondents 
whose head of household was currently out of work were by far the most 
likely to name unemployment their worst economic problem. Only a 
minority of these respondents cited it, however -- the figures ranged 
from "3 percent in 1974 to 27 percent in 1976. Although around 60 
percent of respondents in these surveys were also heads of households, 
the analysis shown in 'Iable 4 presumably excluded a large number of 
respondents for whom unemployment would not be a serious hardship, 
e.g. young people desiring only seasonal employment, members of 
families with other wage earners, students or mothers looking for 
part-time work. Given that their family's chief breadwinner was 
currently out of work, the percentage of these respondents to whom 
unemployment was a salient, pressing problem was surprisingly low. 
Several factors are probably responsible for this finding. As 
indicated earlier, it seems doubtful that unemployment compensation is 
the primary reason -- while a�majority of the currently unemployed 
heads of household were probably receiving some compensation, such 
benefits fell far short of their previous income. A more important 
reason is probably that in many jobs periodic bouts of unemployment 
are expected, and seen as a natural part of the job. Similarly, a 
lack of job security is often counterbalanced by relatively high wage 
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rates. Employment in the construction industry is a prime example -­
a construction worker is virtually certain to be laid off from time to 
time, but while working receives higher wages than he or she would at 
most other jobs requiring comparable levels of training and education. 
'Io the extent periodic unemployment is expected and can be prepared 
for, its salience as a personal problem would decline. 
Expectations could also be important in another way. Not only 
would unemployment seem less serious if it were a "normal" occurrence 
-- it would also seem less threatening to individuals who expect to be 
working again soon. As Rosenstone [1980) points out, Census Bureau 
surveys indicate that over half of the unemployed return to work in 
five weeks or less. And as shown in 'Iable 4, respondents who reported 
that their head of household was temporarily laid off cited 
unemployment far less frequently than those who reported his or her 
status as unemployed. Presumably this is because the former group was 
more likely than the latter to expect renewed employment in the near 
future. Furthermore, 'Iable 4 also suggests that the salience of 
unemployment is influenced by the general state of the economy. 
Respondents whose head of household was currently unemployed or 
temporarily laid off cited unemployment much more frequently in 1974 
than in 1976. 'Ibis seems understandable, given that the putlook for 
renewed employment was probably much brighter in late 1976, a period 
of recovery, than in late 1974, when the economy was rapidly plunging 
into a deep recession. 
It also appears that the pain of past joblessness is quickly 
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discounted. Less than 10 percent of respondents from families whose 
head was currently employed but had been out of work in the previous 
year named unemployment their worst economic problem. Now it seems 
unlikely that people simply forget about the income loss and other 
damaging effects engendered by unemployment. Rather, it seems more 
likely that they feel past unemployment difficulties are water over 
the dam, that there is nothing they can do about it now, and that it 
is best to get on with the problems of the present. Given that the 
personal salience of such difficulties fades quickly, it is likely 
that their impact upon voting decision rapidly dissipate& as we11.ll 
As with unemployment, only small numbers of respondents 
referred to taxes as their most serious economic problem. Concern 
over taxes also failed to exhibit a consistent influence upon voting 
decisions. Things may well have been different in 1978, if the highly 
publicized "tax revolt" was indicative of widespread discontent over 
personal tax burdens. Unfortunately the 1978 CPS survey did not 
include the personal problems questions, so there is no way to know. 
Plenty of people, however, fell into the remaining categories, 
reporting inflation, a declining real income, or general miscellaneous 
economic problems to be personally troublesome. Yet none of these 
various economic difficulties exerted a clear, consistent effect upon 
voting. 'What explains this absence of effects? 
According to Sniderman and Brody [1977) , whether or not 
personal problems are politically significant depends on how such 
problems are perceived. People may see the economic problems 
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troubling them as general and widespread, as something they share with 
many other people throughout society. To the extent they believe 
their fortunes depend on the nation's economy� upon which 
governmental policies presumably have some influence -- they will see 
their problems as politically relevant, and believe that the 
government could and should take action to alleviate them.12 on the 
other hand, they may believe their fortunes depend largely upon wholly 
idiosyncratic factors, i.e. their own physical, mental, and financial 
endowments, what sorts of financial responsibilities they have, or the 
success of the firm with which they are employed, which are not 
directly affected by public policy. To the extent people perceive 
their problems to be rooted in the particular circumstances of their 
own life, they view the role of government to be neither effective nor 
appopriate; rather, it is then their responsibility to deal with their 
problems as best they can. 
Sniderman and Brody were able to distinguish which of these 
two views respondent& held by their answers to a question contained on 
the 1972 and 1974 legs of the CPS Panel Study. After respondents had 
named their most important personal problem (in response to the same 
battery of questions upon which the present analysis is based) they 
were asked: 
Do you think this is something you have to work out on 
your own, or is there someone who ought to be helping 
you with this? • • • 'Who is that? 
Sniderman and Brody found that a large majority of respondents 
looked to themselves rather than to the government for solutions to 
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their problems. This being the case, the small role personal economic 
problems play in influencing voting decisions becomes quite 
understandable. However, they also found that perceptions of 
governmental responsibility varied from one type of problem to 
another. Their analysis was thus repeated using the present study's 
coding scheme. Results are reported in Table 5. The figures reported 
are the percentage of respondents in each category who believed that 
the government should help them cope with their most important 
problem. 
[Table 5 about here] 
The differences between categories are striking. Most 
respondents who named inflation, taxes, or a declining real income 
believed government should be combatting the problem that they found 
personally troublesome.13 Those who named unemployment were less 
likely to feel such assistance was warranted. And the vast majority 
of respondents who cited general or miscellaneous economic problems, 
(like those whose problems were non-economic in nature) believed they 
should take care of their problems on their own. 
These differences make sense in light of Sniderman and Brody's 
reasoning. Complaints about bills, lack of money, and 0th.er general 
economic problems probably are, in most cases, a product of experiences 
which seem peculiar to one's own circumstances, e.g. failing to get an 
expected raise or promotion, having a child who needs braces, or 
unexpected automobile repairs. The opposite is true with inflation. 
When people see food, fuel, or housing prices going up they know that 
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prices are rising not just for themselves, but for everybody. They 
can see that their own experiences with inflation are symptomatic of a 
problem affecting the entire economy, and that there is little they as 
individuals can do about it. Consequently, most people who felt their 
worst problem was inflation believed the government should be trying 
to curb it. 
To be sure, for a problem to systematically affect voting does 
not require every voter who is concerned about it to see the need for 
remedial action on the part of the government. As the present study 
has shown, in the problem area where one's own difficulties did 
consistently affect voting, i.e. unemployment, perceptions of 
government responsibility were less widespread than in the inflation 
and taxes categories. The significant minority of unemployment 
sensitive respondents who felt the government should be helping them 
was evidently enough for effects due to this problem to show up in the 
voting analysis. The ethic of self-reliance, then, is at best only a 
partial explanation for the lack of influence personal economic 
problems exert upon individuals' voting decisions. 
Something more is thus required, and this was pointed out in 
the introduction: policy-oriented voting in response to personal 
economic problems requires voters to perceive differences between the 
parties in the amount of effort and/or skill they apply in combatting 
these problems. Obviously, if a voter believes both parties or 
candidates are equally (un)able to reduce inflation, personal 
difficulties with inflation will not affect his choice between them. 
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Data from the 1972 CPS survey provide some evidence on this 
point. Respondents who stated that the government should help them 
with their worst personal problem were asked: 
Which political party do you think would be most likely 
to get the government (or government agency mentioned) 
to be helpful on this problem? 
Besides naming either the Democrats or the Republicans, respondents 
could report that they saw no difference in the parties' willingness 
or ability to help them. In turn, these respondents could be 
distinguished from those who saw no need for the government to help 
them. 
[Table 6 about here] 
Table 6 reports the size of these various groups in each of 
the problem categories. The information it conveys goes a long way 
toward suggesting why the results of the voting analysis came out as 
they did. Although most respondents who had cited inflation believed 
the government should lend them a helping hand, about half of the 
people in this category believed neither party was more likely than 
the other "to get the government to be helpful" with their problem. 
Those who did see a difference between the parties gave a slight net 
advantage to the Democrats; given the small number of respondents 
involved, however, this narrow edge is of no real significance. A 
similar pattern of findings emerged for respondents who cited either 
taxes or a declining real income. As had been shown earlier, 
respondents who cited general or miscellaneous economic problems 
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rarely believed that their difficulties warranted government action. 
The few that did gave no substantial support to either party -- 6.9 
percent of the total felt they would be better served by the 
Democrats, while a trifling 1.8 percent believed the Republicans would 
be of more assistance. 
As was the case in the voting analysis, the major exception to 
the main pattern of findings here concerned respondents in the 
unemployment category. Although the perceived degree of governmental 
responsibility was only moderate, the party differential was 
substantial. Fully one quarter of the respondents who cited 
unemployment and related problems felt they would fare better under 
the Democrats. Almost none gave the edge to the Republicans. 
Apparently, the main reason that only unemployment consistently 
influenced voters' decisions in the elections studied is because it 
was the only problem in which a real difference was perceived between 
the competence and/or commitment of the two major parties.14 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The hypothesis examined in this paper is that voting in 
response to personal economic problems with inflation and unemployment 
is policy-oriented. The evidence generated herein staves off the 
conclusion suggested by earlier studies, i.e. that personal economic 
problems have no impact whatsoever upon political preferences. The 
bottom line instead is that the impact is a minor one. 
A recurrent finding in this study was that the problems of 
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inflation and unemployment vary considerably along several dimensions. 
Perhaps the most important difference is in the nature of the costs 
they inflict. Although the psychological costs should not be 
underestimated, the objective economic costs of unemployment are 
substantial. The major costs associated with inflation, on the other 
hand, are not objective income and wealth effects, but rather the more 
intangible costs of living in a more uncertain world. Another major 
difference is in the way the costs of inflation and unemployment are 
distributed. There were large differences across racial, 
occupational, and age groups in the percentage of respondents who 
named unemployment their most serious economic problem � differences 
which paralleled the objective rates of unemployment in these groups. 
The impact of inflation, though, appeared to be spread much more 
evenly across the population. The propensity of respondents to name 
inflation their worst economic problem bore virtually no relationship 
to the particular age, income, or occupational group to which they 
belonged, or to their level of educational attainment. This finding 
is entirely consistent with most economic analyses of the costs and 
benefits of inflation. As Piachaud [197 8] puts it, "Inflation acts 
neither as Robin Hood nor as Robber Baron; neither the poor nor the 
rich are affected in a uniform way" (p. 115). 
Finally, personally experienced inflation and unemployment 
differ widely in their political consequences. Americans who cited 
unemployment as their worst personal economic problem were more likely 
to be Democrats, tended to perceive the Democrats as more likely to 
help them with unemployment, and gave greater support to Democratic 
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presidential and congressional candidates even after partisan 
predispositions were taken into account. That respondents named 
inflation their worst economic problem, on the other hand, bore no 
clear relationship to their partisanship or voting behavior. Nor did 
these respondents perceive any real differences between the two 
parties in dealing with inflation. Given the history of the past 15 
years, during which the underlying rate of inflation has risen 
steadily under Democratic and Republican administratins alike, this 
would seem to be a valid inference. In short, in terms of its costs, 
the distribution of its costs, and in its ramifications for party 
support, perceptions of party differences, and voting behavior, 
unemployment lines up neatly with the lines of cleavage drawn up at 
the time of the New Deal. Inflation does not. 
Yet the potential political consequences of inflation are 
massive. The percentage of Americans who find it personally 
troublesome far exceed the figures for unemployment. And those 
concerned about inflation are nearly unanimous in perceiving it to be 
a society-wide problem which government should address. It seems safe 
to conclude that the American electorate is and will continue to be 
keenly interested in the success or failure of those in power to come 
to grips with this problem, and that the politics of the 19 80s will 
largely be the politics of inflation. 
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1. 
FOOTNOTES 
The policy-oriented hypothesis would seem to imply, 
paradoxically, that when in office the Republicans could help 
themselves by allowing a high rate of inflation, while the 
Democrats have the same perverse incentives with regard to 
unemployment. Such a 0strategy, " however, would almost certainly 
be counterproductive. A complete flip-flop on macroeconomic 
policy priorities would not only alienate some of the party' s 
most dependable supporters, but the resultant uncertainty as to 
what the party could be expected to do in office would scare off 
many others [Downs, 1957) . And as Okun [1973) points out, a 
party' s long-term favorable image would surely be eroded by such 
policy failures. To be sure, the present Democratic 
administration would seem to have adopted this strategy. 
President Carter fully supported the Federal Reserve's credit­
tightening moves which helped trigger the 19 80 recession. The 
argument here, though, is not that the Democrats care only about 
unemployment and pay no heed to inflation, while the Republicans 
are prepared to accept any rate of unemployment for the sake of 
price stability. It is, rather, that the parties' relative 
priorities differ, and this point seems secure. Even though 
Carter may have supported typically Republican policies, it is 
hard to believe a Reagan or a Ford would be less zealous than 
Carter in the battle against inflation, or more troubled by 
unemployment. 
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2. 
3. 
It. 
Probit analysis was used instead or ordinary least squares 
regression. The analysis was extended to include presidential as 
well as congressional elections. In the elections in which their 
unemployment variable allowed bouts of joblessness which had 
occurred up to two years prior to the interview to be counted (an 
inordinately long period) this analysis reduced the period to the 
previous six months. 
In the years in which panel data were available [1958, 1960, 
1974, and 1976) du11D11y variables registering the respondents' vote 
in the previous election were used. In other years partisanship 
was specified by a pair of nominal party identification d11111111ies. 
Results were virtually identical, however, under several 
alternative specifications, including 1) substitution of the 
previous vote terms with nominal party identification dummies, 
and 2) controls upon a large battery of social and economic 
background characteristics. 
These data were made available by the Inter-University Consortium 
for Political and Social Research. Neither the original 
collectors of the data not the consortium bear any responsibility 
for the analyses or interpretations presented here. 
5. Unfortunately the machine-readable coding categories developed by 
the CPS for these items were, for present purposes, not 
appropriate. It was, therefore, necessary to recode the
responses as they appeared on the original protocols. 
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The staff at CPS was extremely accommodating and helped make 
the task much less ardous than it might have been. I would like 
to thank Warren Miller for his approval of the project, and Ann 
Robinson, Alice Hayes, and Maria Sanchez for their valuable 
assistance. 
6. It has been argued, of course, that inflation is a problem only 
7. 
8. 
when it is unanticipated, and that a world in which the inflation 
rate were a steady, fully anticipated 10 percent per annum would 
be as predictable and secure as a world with stable prices. 
According to Okun [197 5), however, the goal of "steady inflation" 
is a "mirage." As he put it: 
The main problem of steady inflation as a goal is its 
lack of credibility. Targetting on a stable first 
derivative is admitting failure in the effort to 
stabilize the level. Why should anyone expect any 
greater success in stabilizing the rate of change of 
the price level than in stabilizing the price level? (p. 3 85). 
These analyses also indicated that the decision to differentiate 
respondents who cited a declining real income from those who 
mentioned inflation was a prudent one. The former were 
considerably more likely to report being worse off financially, 
and references to a declining real income came considerably more 
frequently from low income groups and retirees. 
Perfectly anticipated inflation, of course, results only in a 
change in the numbers registering the relative value of goods and 
services. And it is by definition true that unanticipated 
inflation benefits net debtors and harms net creditors when 
assets and liabilities are in fixed prices. But that really 
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doesn' t tell us much. In a masterful study of the effects of 
inflation upon incomes and wealth in the United Kingdom, Piachaud 
[1978) demonstrates that for most individuals most of the time 
these effects cancel each other out. Secondly, it is often 
argued that prices for food, fuel, and other necessities 
generally inflate at a higher rate than do prices for 
nonessential goods; if true, lower income groups, who spend a 
higher percentage of their income on necessities, would be 
disproportionately hurt. Vasilatos and Hibbs [1977) calculated 
occupation and age specific price indices (based upon the average 
"basket" of goods and services typically purchased by members of 
each group), but found they all closely resembled figures for the 
national Consumer Price Index. In short, the data on objective 
effects and subjective assessments point to the same conclusion 
� the costs of inflation are distributed pretty evenly across 
all major groups in society. 
9. Friedman [1977) and other conservative economists, though, argue
that in the long run inflation does have serious objective costs. 
They believe that it discourages new investment in productive 
enterprises, and that it can thus eventually retard economic 
growth and employment. As Friedman sees it, this mea�� that 
contrary to the Phillips curve, in the long run the relationship 
between inflation and unemployment is actually positive. 
10. If personal economic problems produce changes in partisanship, a 
cross-sectional analysis which specified partisanship could 
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underestimate the effects of these problems upon voting. And 
recent studies have shown that party identification, as measured 
by the standard seven point scale, is affected by short-term 
forces. Fiorina ( 1979) found that between 1974 and 1976 
respondents' partisanship changed in accordance with their 
overall ratings of the president, their views on the Nixon 
pardon, and their assessments of the government's performance in 
managing the economy. Brody' s ( 1977) study generated similar 
findings. His analyses, however, strongly indicated that most of 
the instability is in the strength component , e.g. movements from 
"strong" Democratic to "weak" Democrat; there was very little 
change in the basic direction of identification, e.g. movements 
from Democrat to Republican. Thus in 1972, when only cross­
sectional data are available, the partisanship indicators 
incorporate only the directional component. In the other two 
years the respondent' s vote in the previous election will be 
specified. (This means the previous congressional election when 
congressional elections are analyzed, but the previous 
presidential election for presidential elections. Thus in 1976 
the previous vote considered in the congressional equation was 
from 1972, while for the presidential election the respondents' 
reported vote for President in 1972 was specified.) 
11. Aggregate level studies have also suggested that the electorate
rapidly discounts economic conditions. Although there are not 
enough data to derive very precise estimates, Fair's ( 1978)
analysis indicated that votes for President were best predicted
3 5  
12. 
by economic conditions in the second and third quarters of the 
election year. Similarly, Kernell ( 1978) found that inflation 
and unemployment best predicted presidential popularity when 
change in their levels across the previous six months was 
considered. 
The argument here is that the more universalistically people view 
the nature of their problems, the more likely they are to hold 
the government r esponsible for alleviating them. The data here 
and in Sniderman and Brody's study certainly indicate this is a 
reasonable generalization. Quite likely, however , people also 
respond politically to more selective policies (e.g. which affect 
them in their roles as taxpayers, farmers, or machinists laid off 
upon cancellation of the B-1 bomber project) but which also have 
a readily apparent impact upon their personal well-being. 
13. It seems surprising that anyone would name taxes their worst 
economic problem and B.Q.J:. believe that the government should 
assist them. After all , government is the only institution which 
levies taxes, and thus the only one which can reduce them. What 
is probably the case, though, is that many respondents simply 
failed to imagine any tax assistance coming from the government, 
given that it is government which is the source of their problem. 
To some extent this argument may also apply to concerns over 
inflation. 
1 4.  While the evidence in Table 6 is supportive of this claim, it is 
only indirectly so. The cross-tabulation was based upon all 
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respondents , not j ust voters, and a direct test would require the 
table to be broken down again by reported vote choice. 
Alternatively, this could be done with a probit equation which 
specified third order interaction terms; if this claim is correct ,  the 
largest pro-Democratic estimate would be for the group of respondents 
who cited unemployment ,  believed the government should play some role 
in assisting them, and who also perceived differences between the 
parties with regard to unemployment . Unfortunately there are far too 
f ew cases available to have any confidence in the results of either 
analysis ; it would require,  for instance, partitioning the group of 16 
individuals who cited unemployment in 1972 and also voted into the four 
categories formed by the columns in Table 6 .  In this case it seemed 
more reasonable to make inferences based upon indirect evidence and 
(liarely} sufficient N, rather than upon a more direct test involving a 
hopelessly small number of cases . 
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TABLE 1 
THE EFFECT OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD ' S  UNEMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE 
AND TREND IN FAMILY FINANCES ON VOTING IN CONGRESSIONAL 
AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS , 1956-1978
YEAR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 
Head ' •  Unemployment Personal Read ' s  Unemployment Personal 
erience8 Finances erience3 Finances 
1956 - . 097 - . 134** - . 65 9  - . 087** 
( . 513) ( . 031) ( . 59 7 )  ( . 034) 
1958 - - - . 413* - . 103** 
( . 243) ( . 03 6 )  
1960 - .  659** - . 046 - . 335 - . 019 
( . 241) ( . 030) ( . 27 1, )  ( . 033) 
1962 - - -. 244 . 037 
( . 230) ( . 04 2 )  
1964 - . 5 79 . 040 - . 14 8  - . 014 
( . 355) ( . 033) ( . 314) ( . 035) 
1966 - - -. 630 - .  077* 
( . 560) ( . 036) 
1968b . 130 . 134** - . 411 . 037 
( . 305 ) ( . 038) ( . 308) ( . 048) 
1970 - - - . 211 - . 008 
( . 308) ( . 048) 
1972 - .  523** -. 078* - . 395* -. 022 
( . 150) ( . 037) ( . 179) ( . 01, 1 )  
1971, - - - . 04 1  . 032 
( . 155) (.  030) 
1976 - . 210 - . 081** - . 03 9  - . 131** 
( . 131) ( . 029) ( . 157) ( . 031,) 
1978 - - - . 09 3  - . 007 
( . 132) ( . 02 6 )  
** • p < . Ol ;  * = p < . 05 
a. In all elections between 1958 and 1964 , as well as in 1968 and 1970,
this variable indicated Yhether or not the respondent ' s  head of 
household had been unemployed in the previ ous six months .  From 1972
on the t ime frame was the previous year, and in 1956 and 1966 i t
could only be ascertained whether or n o t  t h e  head 1o1as currently out 
of work. 
b. Wallace voters were excluded from the presidential election analysis 
in 1968.
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TABLE 2 
MOST IMPORTANT PERSONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 
Inflation 
Declining Real Income 
Unemployment Related 
Taxes 
General of Misc. 
Economic Problems 
Nonecomonic Problems 
No Problem Mentioned 
Total 
Na 
(in percentages) 
1972 1974 
14 . 4  30 . 2  
4 . 8  7 . 1  
3 . 4  4 . 4  
5 . 5  1 . 3  
18 . 6  19 . 2  
32 . 5  24 . 4  
20 . 8  13 . 4  
100 . 0  100 . 0  
(1109) (2523) 
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1976 
22 . 2  
5 . 9  
4 . 0  
4 . 1  
19 . 8  
2 6 . 8  
17 . 2  
100 . 0  
(2415) 
a. Ns are based on the 1972 , 19 74 , and 1976 cross-sectional weighted
samples of all respondents . No important turnout effects were
present , however , so the percentages reported here are vitually
identical when voters only are considered. Weights are not used
in any of the probit analysis . 
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TABLE 3 
THE EFFECT OF PERSONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 
ON VOTING IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS , ] 972-2976 
So 
Democratic 
Republican 
Inflation 
Declining 
Real Income 
Unemployment 
Related 
Taxes 
General Economic 
Problems 
N 
* p < . 05 
** p < . 01 
Presidential 
Elections 
1972 1976 
. 527 - . 247 I 
- . 794** - . 69 9** I (. 176) ( . 146) 
. 854** . 788** 
( . 196) ( . 125) 
. 293* - . 002 
( . 160) ( . 113) 
- . 079 - . 114 I ( . 232) ( .  204) 
- . 349 - . 452* I ( .  291) ( . 251) 
. 145 - . 064 I ( .  228) ( . 230) 
I . 058 - . 07 6  ( . 143) ( . 121) 
760 923 I 
a .  Not included in this equation due to low N.  
Congressional 
Elections 
1972 1974 
. 0095 - . 435 
- . 978** - . 566** 
( . 186) ( . 127)  
. 834** 1 . 12** 
( . 188) ( . 129) 
- . 096 -. 040 
( . 170) ( . 116) 
- . 201 - . 237 
( . 2 96) ( . 175)  
- . 5 94 - . 189 
( .  417) ( . 284) 
-. 409* a -
( . 245) 
. 062 . 129 
( . 157)  ( . 140) 
645 863 
45 46 
TABLE 4 
References to UnemEloyment as a Personal Problem as 
a Function of Obj ective UnemEloyment ExEeriences 
1972-76 
1976 
- . 343 Percent naming unemployment 
Head of household ' s  their worst personal economic 
- . 270** objective emEloyment status 12.roblem 
( . 122) 
1972  1974  1976  
1 . 18** 
( . 137)
Currently Unemployed 36 . 4  42 . 9  27 . 3
- . 211 Temporarily Laid Off 11 . l  13 . 1  4 . 8
( . 132) 
- . 127 Employed, But Had Been Out of 9 . 1  9 . 3  5 . 8Work in the Previous Year 
( . 223) 
- . 492* Employed , Never Out of Work 1 . 9  2 . 1  3 . 2in the Previous Year 
( . 296) 
. 250 
( . 250) 
Ns upon which percentages 
are based 
22 35 66 
. 044 
( . 145) 1 8  3 8  42  
1 3 2  1 5 0  206  
689 675 9 0 1  1079  
TABLE 5 
Perceptions of Governmenta l Responsibil ity 
by Type of Economic Problem 
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Most important 
personal problem 
Percentage of respondents who believe 
Inflation 
Declining 
Real Income 
Unemployment 
Related 
Taxes 
General or Mis c .  
Economic Problems 
Noneconomic 
Problems 
government should be helping them 
1 9 7 2  1974  
71 . 0a 66 . 7(124 ) ( 4 2 6 )  
54 . 2 61 . 2( 4 8 )  (116 ) 
43 . 8 41 . 2( 32 )  ( 5 1 )  
62 . 7 b ( 51 )  
20 . 0 33 . 6( 16 0 )  ( 2 3 8 )  
19 . 2 16 . 2( 4 6 3 )  ( 5 2 5 )  
a .  Numbers i n  parentheses are N s  upon which the percentages are 
based . The questions which asked respondents to indicate 
who , if anyone , should be helping them with their prob lems 
were asked only in reference to their most important personal 
problem . Thus , the ana lys is could not be performed upon their 
mos t important personal economic problem, which was used in 
the voting analysis , and Ns of the economic problem categories 
are s lightly reduced . The 1976  survey did not include these 
questions . 
b .  Not reported due to low N .  
TABLE 6 
Perceptions of the Major Parties ' Ability 
to Handle Economic Problems , 1 9 7 2  
Respondents ' 
most important 
personal economic 
problems 
Inflation 
Declining 
Real Income 
Unemployment 
Related 
Taxes 
General or Mis c .  
Economic Problems 
Noneconomi c 
Problems 
( in percentages ) a 
No gov ' t
action 
needed 
29 . 0
45 . 8
56 . 2
37 . 3
80 . 0
80 . 8
No di fference 
between parties 
34 . 7
27 . 1
15 . 6
27 . 5
11 . 3
11 . 9
Democrats 
better 
21 . 0
18 . 8
25 . 1
21 . 5
6 . 9
4 . 3
48 
Republicans 
better 
15 . 3
8 . 3
3 .1
13 . 7
1 . 8
3 . 0
a .  I n  thi s table the rows add up to 1 0 0  percent, not the columns . 
Percentages are based upon the s ame Ns as they were in Table s .  
